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Rodolphe Desbordes

Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde, United Kingdom

Gary Koop

Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde, United Kingdom
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, Italy

THE KNOWN UNKNOWNNS OF GOVERNANCE

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The Known Unknowns of Governance*

Rodolphe Desbordes[†]

Gary Koop[‡]

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Abstract: Empirical researchers interested in how governance shapes various aspects of economic development frequently use the Worldwide Governance indicators (WGI). These variables come in the form of an estimate along with a standard error reflecting the uncertainty of this estimate. Existing empirical work simply uses the estimates as an explanatory variable and discards the information provided by the standard errors. In this paper, we argue that the appropriate practice should be to take into account the uncertainty around the WGI estimates through the use of multiple imputation. We investigate the importance of our proposed approach by revisiting in three applications the results of recently published studies. These applications cover the impact of governance on (i) capital flows; (ii) international trade; (iii) income levels around the world. We generally find that the estimated effects of governance are highly sensitive to the use of multiple imputation. We also show that model misspecification is a concern for the results of our reference studies. We conclude that the effects of governance are hard to establish once we take into account uncertainty around both the WGI estimates and the correct model specification.

Keywords: governance, multiple imputation. **JEL codes:** C1, F1, F2, O11.

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[†]Corresponding author. University of Strathclyde. Address: Department of Economics, Sir William Duncan Building, University of Strathclyde, 130 Rottenrow, Glasgow G4 0GE, Scotland, United Kingdom. Telephone/Fax number: +44 141 548 3961/+44 141 548 5776. E-mail: rodolphe.desbordes@strath.ac.uk

[‡]University of Strathclyde. gary.koop@strath.ac.uk

1 Introduction

The importance of governance in many aspects of economic development has been strongly emphasised in recent years.¹ For instance, studies have investigated the impact of governance on long-run economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004); poverty (Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Kraay, 2006); foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000; Daude and Stein, 2007; Azémar and Desbordes, 2009; Azémar, Darby, Desbordes, and Wooton, 2012); broad capital flows (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2008; Faria and Mauro, 2009; Binici, Hutchison, and Schindler, 2010); international trade (Méon and Sekkat, 2008; Berden, Bergstrand, and Etten, 2014); international aid allocation (Winters, 2010; Dietrich, 2013). This list of papers barely touches the surface of the large literature relating to governance.

Of course, when doing empirical work, the researcher must have data on the concepts being measured. In addition to the theoretical debates about what “governance” is (see, e.g., discussion in Arndt and Oman (2006); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007); Thomas (2010)), it is also something that is difficult to measure in practice. Different proxies for governance exist, based on various underlying data sources (e.g. surveys of experts). Arndt and Oman (2006, chapter 2) and Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) provide an overview of these proxies and their sources. Perhaps the most widely used are those produced by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011)).

The WGI project provides quantitative information on six dimensions of governance, by averaging in a statistically sophisticated manner a very large number of underlying variables coming from thirty-two independent data sources.² These estimates are only

¹Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) define governance as “*the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them*” (p.22). In the literature, the terms “governance”, “institutions”, and “institutional quality” are often used interchangeably.

²Høyland, Moene, and Willumsen (2012) and Standaert (forthcoming) extend the WGI methodology in

proxies for these six aspects of governance: they are related to the former but do not correspond to their true, and unobservable, values. This point seems to have been largely missed by the empirical literature on governance and development. Researchers simply include the WGI estimates in their econometric models and fail to discuss the uncertainty involved in their construction, despite the fact that the WGI project provides a standard error for each estimate.³ In this paper, we investigate whether this common neglect has benign or critical consequences for the results of the studies which have used the WGI.

We first explain how multiple imputation can be used to take into account the uncertainty around the WGI estimates. Our procedure exploits the “known unknown” that the standard errors provide about the unobserved values of governance. We then investigate the relevance of our suggested approach in several applications, where we revisit the findings of several published studies. These applications are related to the impacts of governance on (i) capital flows; (ii) international trade; (iii) income levels around the world. We find that size and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients on the WGI are strongly sensitive to the use of multiple imputation. Furthermore, we show that the “known unknowns” of governance are not confined to the uncertainty of the WGI estimates. They also encompass uncertainty about the correct model specification. It is always possible that studies have not adopted the correct functional form, used a consistent estimator, included all relevant variables, or dealt with influential observations. Indeed, while we had no trouble to replicate the results of the published studies on which our applications are based, we demonstrate that their findings are not robust to changes in model specification.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we explain how multiple imputation can be used to take into account the uncertainty of the WGI estimates. In

various ways.

³Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) is one of the rare papers which exploit the WGI standard errors. They use them to identify the causal impact of income per capita on governance. Note that the creators of the WGI (or the creators of aggregate governance indicators based on extensions of the WGI methodology) have consistently stressed the uncertainty of the governance estimates that they provide.

section 3, we present our three applications. Section 4 concludes.

2 Multiple imputation and the econometrics of unobserved explanatory variables

In this paper, we are interested in the impact of governance on various economic outcomes. However, governance is not directly observed. Instead we have data on the WGI. Accordingly, in a general sense, we are in a situation where we have an unobserved explanatory variable. In the econometric literature, there are various perspectives relating to explanatory variables which are unobserved in some manner (e.g. proxy variables, variables measured with error, generated regressors, missing values). In this section, we discuss these various perspectives, how they relate to our particular empirical problem, and how multiple imputation can be used to treat them. We will frame this discussion in the context of the simple linear regression model, but similar issues will hold in the more complicated models used in our applications.

We assume the regression of interest relates a dependent variable y_i (for $i = 1, \dots, N$) to an explanatory variable x_i^*

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta x_i^* + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where ε_i is i.i.d. $N(0, \sigma^2)$ and uncorrelated with x_i^* . Here x_i^* is the true value of governance in country i , a concept which we do not directly observe. We let $y = (y_1, \dots, y_N)'$ denote all the observations on the dependent variable and adopt a similar notation convention for explanatory variables. With the WGI variables, estimates of governance (which we will call x_i) are produced along with standard errors ($\sigma_{x_i}^2$) capturing their uncertainty. If we assume that the WGI variables are aiming to provide estimates of the true value of governance (as distinct from the proxy variable interpretation to be discussed shortly), then the discussion of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011), p.229, can be taken to

imply that:⁴

$$x_i^* \sim N(x_i, \sigma_{x_i}^2) \quad (2)$$

or, equivalently,

$$x_i^* = x_i + u_i \quad (3)$$

where u_i for $i = 1, \dots, N$ are $N(0, \sigma_{x_i}^2)$ random variables, uncorrelated with each other and with ε_i . The existing empirical literature uses x_i instead of the true value of governance, x_i^* . The statistical literature on measurement error (see, e.g. Carroll, Ruppert, Stefansky, and Crainiceanu (2006)) distinguishes between Berkson and classical measurement error and the specification given in (3) is consistent with the former of these.

2.1 Bayesian approach and multiple imputation

Multiple imputation was initially derived from a Bayesian perspective (see Rubin (1987)) and, although in this paper we use frequentist⁵ methods, the Bayesian approach is a natural one for explaining the basic ideas of multiple imputation and why they are important for empirical practice.

For the Bayesian, standard regression methods for learning about β and σ^2 are based on the posterior $p(\beta, \sigma^2 | y, x)$ which is proportional to the prior times the likelihood function. For instance, in the absence of prior information, the posterior mean (a common point estimate) is the OLS estimate from the regression of y on x^* . How does the Bayesian proceed if x^* is not observed, but (2) is available? The first step is to construct the so-

⁴This interpretation is consistent with how Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) summarise their aggregation procedure: “the output of our aggregation procedure is a distribution of possible values of governance for a country, conditional on the observed data for that country. The mean of this conditional distribution is our estimate of governance, and we refer to the standard deviation of this conditional distribution as the “standard error” of the governance estimate” (p.16). The normality assumption is made on p.229 of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011). Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) show that adopting alternative distributions of governance would yield estimates and standard errors qualitatively similar to those obtained under the assumption of normality.

⁵Frequentist statistics is sometimes referred to as classical statistics.

called complete data posterior $p(\beta, \sigma^2|y, x^*, x)$ which is proportional to the complete data likelihood (i.e. the likelihood function constructed assuming x^* is observed). The second step is to integrate out the unknown x^* . That is,

$$\begin{aligned} p(\beta, \sigma^2|y, x) &= \int p(\beta, \sigma^2|y, x^*, x) dx^* \\ &\propto \int p(\beta, \sigma^2) L(\beta, \sigma^2|y, x^*, x) dx^* \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where $p(\beta, \sigma^2)$ is the prior and $L(\beta, \sigma^2|y, x^*, x)$ the complete data likelihood.⁶ Rubin (1996) expresses this relationship as saying that the actual posterior distribution is the average of the complete data posterior distribution. The averaging can be done using simulation methods which in this case are particularly simple:

1. Simulate $s = 1, \dots, S$ draws $x_i^{*(s)}$ for $i = 1, \dots, N$ from the $N(x_i, \sigma_{x_i}^2)$ distribution.
2. For each of these draws, use the posterior $p(\beta, \sigma^2|y, x^{*(s)})$ to carry out the desired econometric inference.
3. Average inferences over all S estimates produced in step 2.

In step 2, the posterior $p(\beta, \sigma^2|y, x^{*(s)})$ is based on x^* instead of x and is the familiar posterior for the Normal linear regression model, but using the simulations, $x_i^{*(s)}$, as explanatory variables.⁷ We do not provide a complete proof justifying this strategy as being the correct way of doing Bayesian inference in the simple regression model under the assumptions specified above (see, e.g., Blackwell, Honaker, and King (2012) for complete derivations at a greater level of generality). The point we stress is that a simulation-based empirical strategy for correctly handling uncertainty of the sort that exists with the WGI variables falls naturally out of the Bayesian approach.

⁶The WGI project provides $\sigma_{x_i}^2$ for $i = 1, \dots, N$ and, hence, we are not treating these as an unknown parameters.

⁷The exact formula for this posterior is available in any Bayesian econometrics textbook. See, for instance, chapter 3 of Koop (2003).

The Bayesian strategy just described is the correct and valid way of updating inference on β . One could imagine a second strategy which involved using standard Bayesian results based on a regression of y on x . It can easily be shown that the posterior for the regression coefficient in such a regression is not the same as the posterior obtained using the correct strategy just described and, hence, should be avoided. Another way of saying this is that standard regression methods would be equivalent to the correct way of doing inference in this model if, in Step 1, the simulated values of x_i^* were all precisely equal to the mean, x_i . This would only occur if $\sigma_{x_i}^2 = 0$ and there is no uncertainty in the WGI. This illustrates a point made previously in a different way: conventional methods incorrectly ignore the uncertainty WGI variables.

The strategy outlined in the three steps also goes by the name of multiple imputation and the draws of Step 1 are called imputations.

Multiple imputation was developed as a tool for estimating a variety of models (e.g. regression models with and without endogenous regressors, various panel data models, etc.) where variables have missing values (see, e.g., Rubin (1996)). The setup defined by (1) and (2) can be interpreted as a kind of missing data problem (i.e. where the variable of interest, x^* , is missing but equation 2 provides us with information about what it is which can be used to impute values of the missing x^*). It can also be interpreted as a measurement error problem. Multiple imputation has been interpreted in both these fashions in several papers (e.g., among others, Brownstone and Valletta (1996) and Blackwell, Honaker, and King (2012)).⁸

2.2 Links between Bayesian and frequentist approaches

Bayesian Econometrics have gained in popularity in the last two decades but the frequentist paradigm still dominates the empirical literature. Fortunately, multiple imputation is compatible with frequentist estimators and can be implemented in standard econometric

⁸Another paper worth noting is Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton (2010) which, although it does not use multiple implementation, uses related methods to address the problems which arise when an important concept (in their case democracy) is not directly observed, but instead a variety of proxies for it exists.

software like Stata. While multiple imputation has been developed from a Bayesian perspective, repeated-imputation inference is still valid from a frequentist perspective. The presence of the likelihood function in (3) provides the link with frequentist econometric methods which are basically the same as Bayesian ones except ignoring the $p(\beta, \sigma^2)$ term. Before discussing multiple imputation, we first remind the reader of the textbook frequentist econometric treatment of measurement error problems.

A distinction is typically made between proxy variables (which is an extension of the Berkson measurement error specification) and classical measurement error. An unobserved explanatory variable which has a well-defined quantitative interpretation (annual income of a worker) but is measured with error (e.g. reported annual income) falls into the measurement error case. The proxy variable case arises if an unobserved concept (e.g. ability) is replaced by an observed variable that is merely associated with it (e.g. IQ score). In this sense, and for the reasons mentioned above, the WGI are best thought of as proxy variables. The econometric issues associated with the use of proxy variables are discussed in many textbooks (e.g. Wooldridge (2009, section 9.2)). Suppose we do not observe x_i^* but instead observe a proxy, x_i where

$$x_i^* = \gamma + \delta x_i + u_i \quad (5)$$

where u_i is i.i.d. and uncorrelated with ε_i . As long as x_i and u_i are uncorrelated (the standard assumption in the proxy variable case), ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of y on x produces a consistent estimate of $\delta\beta$ (but not β). This does not preclude sensible empirical analysis since, if x_i is a good proxy for x_i^* it should be the case that $\delta > 0$ and, therefore, OLS results can be used to gauge the sign and significance of the explanatory variable being proxied. In the multiple regression case, estimates of the coefficients on other explanatory variables will be consistent if u_i is uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables.

From a Bayesian perspective, the proxy variable interpretation does not alter the ba-

sis validity of the multiple imputation strategy defined above, except that instead of the posterior of β , we would be uncovering the posterior of a parameter proportional to β . But how does the frequentist interpret multiple imputation in this context? For the frequentist, values of x_i^* can still be imputed as in step 1 and used in a multiple imputation procedure. The only difference with the Bayesian approach that we outlined above is that a frequentist estimator is used in step 2.

The existing empirical literature uses x_i , the estimate of a WGI variable, as the proxy for governance. For the reasons discussed previously, the consequences of this are not inconsistency (at least in terms of estimating $\delta\beta$). However, such a procedure ignores the uncertainty in the proxy variable. In other words, previously we interpreted the WGI project methodology described in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) as implying $x_i^* \sim N(x_i, \sigma_{x_i}^2)$. If this is a fair representation of what is intended by those constructing the WGI variables, then the ideal would be to use the entire distribution of x_i^* (which contains useful information about the uncertainty associated with calculating the WGI variable) as the proxy variable and not x_i . Multiple imputation is a method which allows us to do this. In practice, results produced using multiple imputation can differ markedly from non-multiply-imputed results, even if the latter are not inconsistent. It is worth stressing that multiple imputation can influence both point estimates and standard errors, although the direction of influence is theoretically unclear. That is, estimates and standard errors could either be smaller or larger than those produced without multiple imputation.

The methods we use also relate to another frequentist econometric issue: generated regressors. This occurs if an explanatory variable is replaced by an estimate where the estimate is obtained from a secondary equation. In this case OLS is (under standard assumptions) consistent, but standard errors are incorrect. Insofar as we interpret x_i as a generated regressor, then using multiple imputation allows us to correct the generated regressor problem.

This section is intended as an intuitive summary of what multiple imputation is and

why its use is necessary to obtain valid econometric inference when working with the WGI. In this paper, we use multiple imputation in combination with frequentist estimators (e.g. OLS or fixed effects estimators). The reader interested in formal proofs of the statistical validity⁹ of frequentist approaches to multiple imputation are referred to the textbooks of Rubin (1987) or Schafer (1997).

3 The implications of multiple imputation of the WGI for empirical practice

In this section, we consider several different empirical applications involving the WGI. We systematically compare the results that we obtain when we ignore the uncertainty around the WGI estimates with those produced by our multiple imputation approach.

We first describe the WGI and look at which countries have experienced statistically significant changes in governance between the years 1996 and 2010. We then turn to the re-examination of recently published studies on the impact of governance on (i) capital flows; (ii) international trade; (iii) income levels around the world. While we do not attempt to replicate perfectly their econometric results, we initially closely follow their empirical approach and assess the robustness of their findings to multiple imputation of the WGI. We also investigate whether uncertainty about the correct model specification is a concern for the results of the studies that we revisit. Definitions of all variables and their sources are provided in the Appendix.

3.1 Description of the WGI

The WGI project reports aggregate indicators for six dimensions of public governance: Voice and Accountability (VA); Political Stability (PS); Government Effectiveness (GE);

⁹Frequentist statistical validity in this context is defined as implying consistent point estimates and correct standard errors in the sense that confidence intervals constructed with them will have the correct nominal coverage.

Regulatory Quality (RQ); Rule of Law (RL); Control of Corruption (CC). VA and PS attempt to capture the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced, GE and RQ are related to the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies, while RL and CC assess the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions which govern them.¹⁰

Each indicator is a weighted combination of a large number of different data sources, capturing the views and experiences of survey respondents and experts, e.g. results of the Global Competitiveness Report survey; indices developed by the experts of the non-governmental organisation Freedom House; political risk assessments of the commercial business information provider Political Risk Services; country policy and institutional assessments (CPIA) of the World Bank. The higher the correlation of a given data source with other sources, the higher the weight assigned to this source in the overall average. This reflects the fact that, under the assumption of independent errors across sources, sources can only be correlated with each other if they measure the same underlying unobserved governance dimension. Highly correlated sources are therefore considered more informative about governance than weakly correlated sources, explaining why the former receive a greater weight than the latter. A key feature of the WGI project is the provision of a measure of uncertainty around each estimate of governance. Governance estimates are more precise, i.e. their standard error is smaller, when the number of data sources is high and the different sources strongly agree with each other in their assessment of governance.

Values for each governance indicator range from around -2.5 to 2.5 and are available over the period 1996-2012 for 215 countries. Figure 1 reports the estimates of the six governance dimensions, with an interval of 90% coverage (from 5th percentile to 95th percentile) based on the WGI standard errors, for the year 2010.¹¹ Some countries have

¹⁰For more information, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) and the resources at www.govindicators.org/

¹¹To avoid cluttering, we only report in this figure, and the following one, the estimates for countries with a population of more than 1 million.

very different governance. For example, VA is undoubtedly much stronger in Finland (FIN) than in North Korea (PRK). On the other hand, while the estimated value of VA is higher for Bolivia (BOL) than that for Kenya (KEN), the 95% intervals for both estimates considerably overlap each other, suggesting that the difference in the two estimates is not statistically significant.




Figure 1: The 2010 WGI estimates (interval from 5th to 95th percentile in red)

With regards to the time series dimension, the uncertainty around the WGI estimates implies that changes in their values over time cannot be considered statistically significant for a large number of countries. Figure 2 report the countries for which we cannot reject the absence of change between 1996 and 2010. The mean, lower bound, and upper bound of these estimated changes correspond to the mean, 5th percentile and 95th percentile of 200 imputed changes. It appears that few countries have experienced statistically significant changes in governance over a period of fourteen years. Statistically significant changes have been the most frequent in VA (25% of the countries) and the least

frequent in RL (about 14% of the countries). Finally, it is interesting to note that some countries, like Rwanda (RWA) or Zimbabwe (ZWE) have experienced changes in several governance dimensions. It is of course possible that these various changes are driven by a common latent governance factor.¹²




Figure 2: Estimates of change in governance for countries with significant change (interval from 5th to 95th percentile in red)

We ought to stress that the standard errors provided by the WGI project reflect the assumption that errors are not correlated across sources. If this assumption is wrong, one implication is that the standard errors of the WGI estimates are understated.¹³ Figure 3 illustrates the impact that larger standard errors can have. The number of countries for which changes in GE have been statistically significant over the period 1996-2010 drastically falls when uncertainty around the WGI estimates increases.

¹²A list of the country ISO codes that we use can be found here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1
¹³Intuitively that is because the informativeness of each data source is exaggerated with correlated errors. See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007).



Figure 3: Impact of larger standard errors on the number of countries which have experienced a significant change in governance (interval from 5th to 95th percentile in red)

Overall, a comparison of the confidence intervals depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2 suggests that taking into account the uncertainty of the WGI estimates is likely to have more impact on research exploiting the time-series variation in the WGI than on studies exploiting their cross-sectional dimension. The three applications that we now present use a variety of estimators to assess this issue: pooled, fixed effects, cross-sectional instrumental variables.

3.2 Application 1: Capital flows

3.2.1 Introduction

In a recent paper, Binici, Hutchison, and Schindler (2010) (henceforth BHS) primarily investigate the impact of inward and outward capital controls on debt and equity flows. Nevertheless, among their key results, they find that higher institutional quality, as measured by the average of the six WGI, increases inflows and decreases outflows for both debt and equity. These results echo those of Daude and Stein (2007), Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008), Faria and Mauro (2009) or Azémar and Desbordes (2013). They have been frequently interpreted as providing a partial answer to the Lucas Paradox. Poor countries do not attract large equity inflows because of the low productivity induced by

their poor governance.

3.2.2 Data and econometric methods

In BHS, the dependent variable is the log of financial flows per capita; these financial flows can be equity inflows, debt inflows, equity outflows or debt outflows. The explanatory variables are *de jure* capital account restrictions, various control variables and the average of the six WGI.¹⁴ Like them, we omit oil-exporting countries and keep our sample constant across regressions. Overall, our sample covers 71 countries over the period 1998-2005.¹⁵ We re-examine the regressions of Table 3 of their paper.

BHS estimate their log-linearised model using a fixed effects OLS estimator and a sample devoid of zero values. In a first stage, we do the same. In a second stage, we use a Poisson fixed effects estimator,¹⁶ and we model the conditional mean of financial flows instead of modelling the conditional mean of the log of these flows. This gives us the opportunity to show that our multiple imputation approach can be employed with a variety of estimators while investigating whether BHS's results are robust to the inclusion of zeros values in their sample (a truncation issue) and/or the likely presence of heteroskedasticity. In both cases, the elasticity of capital flows to population is restricted to unity. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.

¹⁴They use the average of the percentile rank of the six indicators. We use the average of the WGI estimates. In that way, we retain cardinal information which would be lost with ranking. Furthermore, we avoid the possibility of a fall in the percentile rank despite better governance. Finally, percentile ranking is sensitive to the introduction of new countries. Nevertheless, in unreported regressions, we find that our key results are unchanged when we use the average of the percentile rank of the six indicators as measure of institutional quality.

¹⁵They report having data over the period 1995-2005. However, data on debt inflow/outflow restrictions are only available from 1997. In addition, the number of observations that they report (727) seem very high given that values for the governance variables are missing for the years 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001. Assuming no other missing data, the number of observations in their sample ought to have been 518 (74 [countries] × 7 [years]).

¹⁶This estimator is robust to distributional misspecification and therefore, as long as the conditional mean function is correctly specified, this estimator is consistent even if the dependent variable is continuous (Winkelmann, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010). Its use is also preferable if the error term is not homoskedastic. In presence of heteroskedasticity, OLS estimation of log-linearised models generates biased estimators of elasticities (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Finally, this estimator is well behaved, even in the presence of a large number of zeros in the sample (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2011).

3.2.3 Empirical results

Our results are presented in Table 1. In the upper panel, columns (1)-(4) are regressions the most comparable to those carried out by BHS in Table 3 of their paper, while columns (5)-(8) report the estimates applying the Poisson fixed effects estimator. The multiple imputation results are provided in the lower panel of Table 1 in columns (1')-(8').

The results of columns (1-4) mirror, at least in qualitative terms, BHS's key findings. Like them, we find that restrictions on capital outflows appear to be much more effective than restrictions on capital inflows and that higher institutional quality tends to encourage capital inflows and discourage capital outflows.¹⁷ However, columns (1')-(4') present a very different picture once we take into account the uncertainty with which the governance variables are measured. In all columns, the estimated coefficient on institutional quality becomes much smaller and is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients on some of the non-imputed variables also lose statistical significance.

Columns (5)-(8) show that the initial results of BHS are not robust to the use of the Poisson fixed effects estimator. Even when we do not do multiple imputation, we no longer find that capital controls and institutional quality influence capital flows.¹⁸ The use of multiple imputation does not change these conclusions and, as in columns (1')-(4'), lead to a strong attenuation of the estimated coefficient on the governance variable.

Overall, we find that BHS's key findings are not robust to accounting explicitly for the uncertainty of the WGI. Our multiple imputation approach leads to a very large fall in the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the governance variable, rendering it statistically insignificant. The reliance of this study on short-run changes to identify the effects of governance on capital flows may explain this result. Furthermore, even with-

¹⁷Results for the other control variables are also very similar across the two studies.

¹⁸Note that inclusion of the zero values increases sample size by about one-third. However, differences in results between columns (1-4) and columns (1')-(4') appear to be primarily driven by the presence of heteroskedasticity; restricting the sample to strictly positive values yields qualitatively similar results.

Table 1: Capital flows and governance

	Debt securities		FDI+portfolio equity		Debt securities		FDI+portfolio equity	
	Inflow	Outflow	Inflow	Outflow	Inflow	Outflow	Inflow	Outflow
	ln(flow/population); Within estimator				flow with offset ln(population); Poisson FE estimator			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Average six WGI	1.190*	-0.483	1.924***	-1.757***	0.468	-0.533	0.700	-1.835
	(0.660)	(0.606)	(0.714)	(0.625)	(0.785)	(0.819)	(0.572)	(1.202)
ln(GDP per cap)	4.796***	3.395***	4.184***	4.951***	7.406***	3.239***	5.299***	2.587***
	(1.302)	(0.928)	(1.487)	(1.383)	(1.852)	(1.164)	(1.295)	(0.906)
Capital in/out-flow control	-0.354	-0.473*	-0.361	-0.644*	0.340	-0.861*	-0.331	0.104
	(0.344)	(0.253)	(0.492)	(0.357)	(0.524)	(0.492)	(0.432)	(0.604)
Private credit/GDP	0.131	1.123	0.198	0.836*	0.263	-0.147	-0.674	0.712*
	(0.707)	(0.682)	(0.593)	(0.487)	(0.504)	(0.502)	(0.642)	(0.387)
STMK CAP/GDP	-0.439	-0.151	0.137	0.615**	-0.816*	-1.098***	-0.178	0.259
	(0.419)	(0.395)	(0.447)	(0.266)	(0.427)	(0.410)	(0.324)	(0.249)
(Fuel, Metals, Ore)/Exports	-2.831	2.941	3.146	-2.190	-7.801**	5.714	2.235	-2.040
	(2.891)	(2.055)	(3.451)	(2.360)	(3.053)	(3.481)	(3.821)	(1.448)
Trade openness	-1.700**	-0.806	-0.964	-0.101	-2.703***	-1.086	-0.943*	0.130
	(0.806)	(0.564)	(0.782)	(0.749)	(0.944)	(0.701)	(0.527)	(0.635)
	Taking into account WGI uncertainty							
	(1')	(2')	(3')	(4')	(5')	(6')	(7')	(8')
Average six WGI	0.203	-0.109	0.366	-0.365	0.092	-0.024	0.082	-0.194
	(0.410)	(0.335)	(0.428)	(0.387)	(0.417)	(0.435)	(0.353)	(0.430)
ln(GDP per cap)	5.026***	3.317***	4.607***	4.555***	7.264***	3.290***	5.211***	2.968**
	(1.303)	(0.942)	(1.506)	(1.404)	(1.732)	(1.183)	(1.256)	(1.295)
Capital in/out-flow control	-0.468	-0.435	-0.394	-0.645*	0.336	-0.812	-0.376	0.273
	(0.348)	(0.263)	(0.538)	(0.356)	(0.510)	(0.500)	(0.460)	(0.570)
Private credit/GDP	0.089	1.142*	0.121	0.909*	0.214	-0.072	-0.740	0.957**
	(0.726)	(0.676)	(0.604)	(0.495)	(0.501)	(0.501)	(0.665)	(0.405)
STMK CAP/GDP	-0.329	-0.193	0.313	0.455	-0.727*	-1.217***	-0.075	0.013
	(0.413)	(0.404)	(0.462)	(0.283)	(0.376)	(0.407)	(0.308)	(0.424)
(Fuel, Metals, Ore)/Exports	-3.408	3.116	2.204	-1.340	-8.101***	6.222*	1.784	-0.778
	(2.940)	(2.070)	(3.806)	(2.890)	(2.991)	(3.495)	(3.596)	(2.260)
Trade openness	-1.705**	-0.807	-0.976	-0.083	-2.735***	-1.022	-0.867	-0.162
	(0.850)	(0.559)	(0.842)	(0.745)	(0.985)	(0.639)	(0.551)	(0.418)
Observations	297	297	297	297	400	400	400	400

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.10$. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 200 imputations.

out applying multiple imputation, BHS's results vanish when we use an alternative fixed effects estimator, which allows for both the dependent variable to be equal to zero and heteroskedasticity.

3.3 Application 2: International trade

3.3.1 Introduction

Berden, Bergstrand, and Etten (2014) (henceforth BBE) investigate the impact of governance on international trade.¹⁹ They estimate gravity equations in which they include, on the destination (importing) side, the six WGI separately in order to isolate their respective impacts. They find that VA and PS both reduce trade overall, whereas RQ increases it. Other WGI (GE, RL, CC) are not statistically significant. They conclude that democracy reduces trade when its main effect is to give more voice to those likely to be affected by international competition, e.g. unskilled workers. This result contrasts with previous literature, which has typically found a positive relationship between democracy and trade openness (Milner and Mukherjee, 2009). BBE argue that is because earlier works did not specifically focus on the pluralism dimension of democracy.

3.3.2 Data and econometric methods

In BBE, the dependent variable corresponds to bilateral exports. The explanatory variables are those which are traditionally found in gravity-type equations (GDP, GDP per capita, bilateral distance, contiguity, common language, colonial history, proxies for multilateral resistance) and the six WGI.²⁰ They use trade data for the period 1997-2004. We simply use all the trade data available in our data source for the same time period. Our dataset includes bilateral trade between 180 countries across five years (1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004).

¹⁹They also look at the impact of governance on foreign direct investment.

²⁰As in the previous application, the authors use their percentile rank while we use their conditional mean. In unreported regressions, we find that our key results hold when we use the percentile rank of the six WGI.

In a first stage, we re-examine one of the main regressions in their paper which is presented in column (6) of their Table 8. Like them, our estimator is the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimator and standard errors are clustered at the importing country level. In a second stage, we investigate the impact of exporting countries' governance on bilateral trade. We also examine whether BBE's findings are robust to the inclusion of country-pair specific fixed effects, i.e. to the potential omission of time-invariant relevant variables which are correlated with the WGI. This is a standard specification test in studies involving panel data. Indeed Wooldridge (2009) argues that "*in many applications, the whole reason for using panel data is to allow the unobserved effect to be correlated with the explanatory variables*" (p. 490).

3.3.3 Empirical results

Our results are presented in Table 2. Column (1) is the regression the most comparable to that estimated by BBE in column (6) of Table 8 in their paper. In column (2), we include the WGI on the exporting side. Columns (1')-(2') provide the multiple imputation results. In columns (3)-(4'), we repeat the same empirical exercise, but using here a fixed effects Poisson estimator instead of a Poisson QML estimator.

The results of column (1) echo the key finding of BBE: destination VA has a strong, negative, and statistically significant impact on trade.²¹ On the other hand, we fail to find a statistically significant relationship between trade and destination PS or destination RQ. Column (2) shows that introducing the WGI on the exporting side does not change these results and, overall, imports and exports are influenced in the same way by the various governance dimensions. Columns (1') and (2') show that, relative to what happened in our previous application, our multiple imputation approach has a much more nuanced influence on the non-imputed results here. The estimated coefficients on VA/GE/RQ/RL/CC, on both exporting and importing sides, are very similar to those found in column (1) and (2). On the other hand, in the case of destination PS, its estimated coefficient becomes

²¹Results for the other control variables are also very similar across the two studies.

Table 2: Bilateral trade flows and governance

	Bilateral trade flows							
	Pooled Poisson QMLE				Fixed effects (FE) Poisson estimator			
			Taking into account WGI uncertainty				Taking into account WGI uncertainty	
	(1)	(2)	(1')	(2')	(3)	(4)	(3')	(4')
Destination VA	-0.394*** (0.084)	-0.376*** (0.073)	-0.415*** (0.090)	-0.403*** (0.080)	0.140** (0.062)	0.144** (0.063)	0.101 (0.066)	0.130** (0.066)
Destination PS	-0.064 (0.058)	-0.102* (0.058)	-0.121** (0.051)	-0.165*** (0.056)	-0.095*** (0.034)	-0.091*** (0.032)	-0.103*** (0.038)	-0.097*** (0.034)
Destination GE	0.511*** (0.130)	0.529*** (0.123)	0.493*** (0.132)	0.516*** (0.125)	0.009 (0.063)	-0.01 (0.057)	-0.007 (0.061)	-0.018 (0.056)
Destination RQ	-0.108 (0.133)	-0.14 (0.130)	-0.097 (0.136)	-0.14 (0.136)	0.066 (0.084)	0.08 (0.084)	0.04 (0.075)	0.059 (0.075)
Destination RL	0.693*** (0.143)	0.709*** (0.123)	0.592*** (0.138)	0.582*** (0.123)	0.111* (0.064)	0.112* (0.064)	0.079 (0.059)	0.093 (0.063)
Destination CC	-0.224** (0.087)	-0.216*** (0.082)	-0.182** (0.084)	-0.158** (0.079)	-0.03 (0.044)	-0.045 (0.045)	-0.048 (0.046)	-0.05 (0.045)
Source VA		-0.562*** (0.078)		-0.582*** (0.078)		0.075* (0.041)		0.063* (0.037)
Source PS		0.110*** (0.026)		0.04 (0.026)		0.003 (0.021)		-0.005 (0.019)
Source GE		0.552*** (0.059)		0.553*** (0.060)		-0.086*** (0.025)		-0.093*** (0.026)
Source RQ		-0.093 (0.123)		-0.089 (0.126)		0.148*** (0.041)		0.131*** (0.041)
Source RL		0.394*** (0.082)		0.287*** (0.083)		-0.008 (0.021)		-0.021 (0.022)
Source CC		-0.188** (0.076)		-0.148** (0.074)		-0.131*** (0.026)		-0.134*** (0.027)
Source ln(GDP)	0.813*** (0.032)	0.818*** (0.025)	0.815*** (0.032)	0.817*** (0.025)	0.939*** (0.322)	1.196*** (0.284)	0.970*** (0.323)	1.173*** (0.291)
Destination ln(GDP)	0.819*** (0.018)	0.821*** (0.020)	0.814*** (0.019)	0.818*** (0.022)	0.981** (0.395)	1.059*** (0.389)	0.927** (0.401)	1.024*** (0.391)
Source ln(GDPPC)	0.024 (0.035)	-0.062 (0.043)	0.023 (0.035)	0.01 (0.042)	0.171 (0.299)	-0.067 (0.261)	0.177 (0.301)	-0.012 (0.280)
Destination ln(GDPPC)	-0.113** (0.046)	-0.113** (0.048)	-0.041 (0.042)	-0.03 (0.047)	0.58 (0.451)	0.504 (0.436)	0.66 (0.446)	0.577 (0.426)
ln(distance)	-0.936*** (0.042)	-0.907*** (0.046)	-0.939*** (0.042)	-0.916*** (0.046)				
Contiguity	0.538*** (0.100)	0.539*** (0.091)	0.538*** (0.100)	0.542*** (0.091)				
Common language	0.288*** (0.097)	0.228*** (0.070)	0.281*** (0.096)	0.211*** (0.071)				
Colonial links	-0.112 (0.126)	-0.059 (0.116)	-0.113 (0.128)	-0.055 (0.120)				
MR ln(distance)	0.767*** (0.077)	0.685*** (0.065)	0.757*** (0.079)	0.659*** (0.067)	-0.643 (0.720)	-1.145* (0.648)	-0.781 (0.704)	-1.308** (0.606)
MR contiguity	-0.446 (0.308)	-0.297 (0.236)	-0.447 (0.314)	-0.317 (0.241)	2.722 (2.527)	3.327 (2.573)	2.498 (2.283)	3.132 (2.438)
MR common language	0.084 (0.153)	0.141 (0.159)	0.118 (0.156)	0.228 (0.166)	-14.912*** (1.900)	-15.731*** (1.719)	-15.079*** (1.923)	-15.824*** (1.745)
MR colonial links	-0.712*** (0.205)	-0.824*** (0.199)	-0.752*** (0.199)	-0.930*** (0.200)	4.088 (3.137)	2.421 (2.945)	4.303 (3.090)	2.471 (2.985)
Source governance	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country-pair specific FE	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	128344	128344	128344	128344	111013	111013	111013	111013

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.10$. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 200 imputations.

larger and now statistically significant at the 5% level whereas the opposite is true for the estimated coefficient on source PS. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient on importing country's GDP per capita becomes much smaller and loses statistical significance with multiple imputation.

In columns (3')-(4'), we introduce country-pair specific fixed effects, controlling in that way for unobserved time-invariant factors which may be correlated with the WGI.²² The inclusion of these fixed effects has a dramatic consequence for BBE's key result that higher destination VA tends to reduce trade. We now find that the VA variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient on both the importing and exporting sides. That is, we are now finding that countries with stronger VA trade more with each other. This holds true regardless of whether we use multiple imputation or not. This reversal of results suggests that the negative effect of destination VA on trade is driven by an omitted variable.²³

Overall, we find that the key findings of BBE are robust to accounting explicitly for the uncertainty of the VA indicator. This is possibly due to the use of a pooled estimator, which exploits both the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of VA. It is worth noting that our conclusion would have been different if BBE had focused on destination PS; with multiple imputation, its estimated coefficient becomes much larger and statistically significant at conventional levels. In addition, BBE's results are reversed when we include country-pair specific fixed effects, suggesting the presence of an omitted variable bias.

²²Similar results are found when we omit the proxies for multilateral resistance.

²³It is also possible that democratisation has a short-term positive effect on trade, which vanishes and even turns negative over time. In their review of the literature on trade and democracy in developing countries, Milner and Mukherjee (2009) suggest that unskilled workers, who represent the majority of the workforce, may support trade liberalisation at first, because they benefit from it, but, on a longer time horizon, may oppose it, because of skill-biased trade increasing income inequality.

3.4 Application 3: Income levels around the world

3.4.1 Introduction

In a seminal paper, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) (henceforth RST) investigate the independent contributions of geography, international integration, and institutions to differences in income levels. To avoid any endogeneity bias, they instrument integration and institutions by the instruments suggested by Frankel and Romer (1999) (constructed “natural” openness) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) (settler mortality). They find that “*the quality of institutions ‘trumps’ everything else*” (p.131).

3.4.2 Data and econometric methods

RST regress the log of GDP per capita in 1995 (\$ PPP) on the absolute latitude of a country (geography), the ratio of nominal trade to nominal GDP (integration), and the WGI Rule of Law for the year 2001 (Institutions). We use the data made available by Dani Rodrik on his website, except for the Rule of Law indicator; the standard errors of the estimated values of this governance dimension are not provided. Our estimates for Rule of Law, and their standard errors, correspond to the year 2000. The sample includes 79 countries from around the world.

We first re-visit their preferred regression, which is presented in column (6) of their Table 1. Then, we examine whether their results are robust to the presence of influential observations in their sample or regional effects, as advocated by Temple (1999). We use a two-stage least square estimator. For each regression, we report the Angrist and Pischke (2009) multivariate first-stage F -statistic, which accounts for the presence of two endogenous regressors, for the instrument $\ln(\text{settler mortality})$.²⁴

²⁴Instruments are usually said to be strong (relevant) when the value of the F -statistic is around 10 or higher (Staiger and Stock, 1997). A less strict rule of thumb is $F > 5$. We do not report the multivariate first-stage F -statistic for the instrument for trade openness, constructed openness, but its value is always above 10 in columns (1)-(3).

3.4.3 Empirical results

Our results are presented in Table 3. The second-stage results are in the upper panel and the first-stage results are in the lower panel. Column (1) is the regression the most comparable to that estimated by RST in column (6) of their Table 1. In columns (2) and (3) we include various dummies to control for influential observations and regional effects. Columns (1')-(3') provide the multiple imputation results.

The results of column (1) are very similar to those of RST. Like them, we find that institutions trump geography and trade openness. The Angrist-Pischke F -statistic suggests that the log of settler mortality is a slightly weak but nevertheless relevant instrument. Column (1') shows that the main impact of using multiple imputation is a lower partial correlation between institutions and $\ln(\text{settler mortality})$. This is reflected in a fall in the value of the Angrist-Pischke F -statistic.

Worries have been expressed in the literature (e.g. Dollar and Kraay (2003), Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), Albouy (2012)) about the influence of some observations on instrumental variables results involving the use of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)'s instrument. Figure 4, which is based on column (1) and depicts the partial relationship between institutions and $\ln(\text{settler mortality})$, highlights potential outliers. These observations correspond to East-Asia growth miracle countries (Hong-Kong and Singapore), neo-European countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States) and Myanmar.

To control for the influence of these observations, we add two dummies in columns (2)-(2'): a Myanmar dummy variable and a "successful countries" dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the country is either a East-Asia growth miracle country or a neo-European country. The coefficient on institutions remains positive, statistically significant, and is now larger than in column (1). It is however much less precisely estimated, as the presence of the two dummy variables reduces the relevance of the instrument $\ln(\text{settler mortality})$. This joint loss in both instrument relevance and precision appears to be greatly

Table 3: Long-run economic development and governance

	ln(GDP per capita in 1995)					
	IV estimation			Taking into account WGI uncertainty		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1')	(2')	(3')
Institutions	1.853*** (0.464)	2.783*** (0.985)	6.159 (11.638)	1.887*** (0.609)	2.981 (1.934)	15.495 (14664)
Geography	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.025)	-0.061 (0.170)	-0.012 (0.025)	-0.018 (0.045)	-0.220 (266)
Integration	-0.053 (0.243)	-0.304 (0.423)	-1.063 (2.878)	-0.064 (0.333)	-0.362 (0.732)	-3.846 (4140)
Successful countries		-3.113* (1.684)	-9.818 (21.714)		-3.453 (3.262)	-27.063 (29164)
Myanmar		4.485*** (1.596)	9.123 (17.199)		4.866 (3.182)	23.784 (20181)
Africa			0.446 (2.336)			1.255 (650)
Latin America			-2.700 (6.313)			-8.038 (9648)
Institutions: first-stage						
	OLS estimation			Taking into account WGI uncertainty		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1')	(2')	(3')
ln(settler mortality)	-0.270*** (0.098)	-0.158** (0.067)	-0.048 (0.086)	-0.269** (0.106)	-0.157* (0.080)	-0.046 (0.099)
Geography	0.020** (0.010)	0.012 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)	0.019* (0.011)	0.011 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)
Constructed Openness	0.108 (0.117)	0.134 (0.103)	0.138 (0.095)	0.109 (0.130)	0.135 (0.118)	0.139 (0.111)
Successful countries		1.549*** (0.232)	1.901*** (0.240)		1.556*** (0.285)	1.911*** (0.300)
Myanmar		-1.952*** (0.127)	-1.726*** (0.181)		-1.974*** (0.309)	-1.746*** (0.348)
Africa			-0.208 (0.261)			-0.209 (0.295)
Latin America			0.477** (0.218)			0.482* (0.250)
Angrist-Pischke F^2 -statistic	6.62	3.95	0.18	5.51	2.69	0.11
Observations	79	79	79	79	79	79

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.10$. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 200 imputations.




Figure 4: Partial relationship between institutions and ln(settler mortality)

magnified by the use of multiple imputation. In column (2'), the Angrist-Pischke F -statistic is smaller than in column (2) and the standard error of the estimated coefficient on institutions is so large that we cannot reject anymore the absence of a statistically significant effect of institutions on income levels.

In columns (3)-(3'), we add regional dummy variables for Latin America and Africa. With the inclusion of these regional effects, the instrument ln(settler mortality) becomes completely irrelevant and the use of this now weak instrument leads to a very large standard error of the estimated coefficient on institutions. This is especially true in the multiple imputation regression, where the values of the standard errors are 3-5 digits numbers.²⁵

Overall, we find that the widely disseminated findings of RST do not hold once we account simultaneously for the uncertainty around the WGI estimates and the presence

²⁵These abnormally large standard errors are due to a small fraction of imputations in which there is no relationship between institutions and income. Across the 200 imputations, the median estimated coefficient on institutions is 4.96 and the median standard error for this coefficient is 16.72.

of influential observations/regions in their sample. The use of multiple imputation plays a large role in the invalidation of RST's results, by weakening the partial correlation between institutions and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)'s instrument. Hence, even when the WGI are used, in a cross-sectional context, as dependent variable, uncertainty around their estimates still matter.

4 Conclusions

Our various applications have highlighted that the estimated effects of governance on various aspects of economic development are extremely sensitive to uncertainty in both the WGI estimates and model specification. Accounting for the uncertainty around the WGI estimates through multiple imputation frequently had a large influence on the size and statistical effects of the different governance dimensions, and occasionally, of other explanatory variables. Furthermore, none of the results of the studies that we revisited survived standard changes in model specification.

This paper shows that the empirical effects of governance can be elusive. Identification of its impact is constantly threatened by the possibilities of measurement error, omitted variable bias, or reverse causality. The efforts of the researcher are not helped by the difficulties of finding a valid instrument, even in a cross-sectional context. Hence, in many cases, the adequate econometric treatment of the uncertainty associated with the WGI coupled with careful model specification remain the most reasonable approach to uncover how governance shapes various economic outcomes.

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Appendix

Table 4: Description of variables

Application	Variable	Description	Source
<i>WGI</i> 1996-2010	Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)	Six Worldwide Governance Indicators (VA, PS, GE, RQ, RL, CC)	WGI project (www.govindicators.org)
<i>Capital flows</i> 71 countries 1998-2005 WGI (1998, 2000, 2002-2005)	Capital inflows (debt or equity) Capital outflows (debt or equity) Capital in/out-flow control Population GDP per capita (Fuel, Metals, Ore)/Exports Trade openness Private credit/GDP STMK CAP/GDP	$-\min(\Delta \text{ assets}, 0) + \max(\Delta \text{ liabilities}, 0)$; per capita, in US \$ $\max(\Delta \text{ assets}, 0) - \min(\Delta \text{ liabilities}, 0)$; per capita, in US \$ Index of financial openness (0-1, from least to most regulated) Total population GDP per capita, in constant 2000 US \$ Sum of the fuel, metals and ore exports divided by total exports (Exports+Imports)/GDP Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP Value of listed shares to GDP	Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) Schindler (2009) World Development Indicators World Development Indicators World Development Indicators World Development Indicators Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009) Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009)
<i>International trade</i> 180 countries 1998-2004 WGI (1998, 2000, 2002-2004)	GDP GDP per capita Bilateral trade flows Distance Contiguity Common language Colonial links Multilateral resistance (MR) terms	GDP, in constant 2000 US \$ GDP per capita, in constant 2000 US \$ Exports from country i to country j Population-weighted bilateral distance (km) 1 if two countries share a common border 1 if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both countries 1 for pair even in colonial relationships Calculated following Baier and Bergstrand (2009)	World Development Indicators World Development Indicators Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010) Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010) Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010) Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010) Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010)
<i>Income levels</i> 79 countries 1995 WGI RL only (2000)	log of income per capita Geography Integration Constructed trade openness ln(settler mortality)	log of income per capita in 1995 (\$ PPP basis) Absolute distance from the equator of capital city Nominal trade to nominal GDP ratio (average 1950-98) Frankel and Romer (1999): predicted trade shares based on geography Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001): estimated settlers' mortality rate	Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) (http://www.fhks.harvard.edu/fs/diodrirk/research.html) Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004)